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Abstract
This document describes Pilot, our submission
for Human-Agent Negotiation Challenge at IJCAI
2020. Pilot is a virtual human that participates in a
sequence of three negotiations with a human part-
ner. Our system is based on the Interactive Arbitra-
tion Guide Online (IAGO) negotiation framework.
We leverage prior Affective Computing and Psy-
chology research in negotiations to guide various
key principles that define the behavior and person-
ality of our agent. Pilot has been selected as one of
the finalists for presentation at IJCAI.
1 Introduction
Negotiation is integral to our everyday interactions, be
it in a vegetable market, at legal proceedings, or even
while finalizing business deals. Negotiation is a com-
plex skill, requiring the ability to combine reasoning with
linguistic and affective knowledge, making it a challeng-
ing task for an automated system. While most of the
research efforts in building automated negotiating agents
have focused on agent-agent negotiations [Lin et al., 2014],
there is recent interest in building agents that can ne-
gotiate with humans as well [Gratch et al., 2015]. Use-
cases include pedagogy [Johnson et al., 2019] and media-
tion [Chalamish and Kraus, 2012]. Development in this area
will also be useful in advancing the capabilities of existing
conversational assistants like Google Assistant, Alexa, and
Siri. The Human-Agent Negotiation challenge at the Auto-
mated Negotiating Agents Competition (ANAC 2020) is one
such step. In this document, we describe our submission for
this competition.
Our agent, referred to as Pilot, is based on the
Interactive Arbitration Guide Online (IAGO) plat-
form [Mell and Gratch, 2016]. Through a combination
of behavior, message, and expression policies, our agent
negotiates with a human partner in a sequence of three
back-to-back negotiations (described in Section 2). We build
on the baseline agent provided to us by the competition
organizers1.
1https://myiago.com/
2 Agent Design
In this section, we present key design features of Pilot and
wherever possible, compare themwith the baseline agent. We
first describe the overall personality of Pilot, followed by key
elements of the three agent policies, namely, behavior, mes-
sage, and expression.
2.1 Agent Personality
Justifying the name, Pilot attempts to lead the negotiation
with the human partner, while also maintaining a friendly per-
sona. This allows Pilot to cater to both the objectives of high
performance and positive opponent perception.
To achieve this, our agent pushes the human partner to
first share some of their preferences before discussing any
offers. Previous results at ANAC show that humans tend
to remain truthful and send out only a few offers them-
selves [Mell et al., 2018a]. Hence, this push allows the agent
to build a reasonable opponent model before rolling out of-
fers. Further, the agent uses phrases like ”Let me help you
out” to help the human in navigating the negotiation and as a
result, portrays itself as experienced and builds a rapport with
the human partner, which has been widely shown to build the
joint value in negotiations [Nadler, 2003]. Further, the agent
does not lie about its preferences and does not hold back in-
formation, when explicitly asked. However, it also does not
give any explicit information, if not asked.
2.2 Behavior Policy
Pilot follows a competitive negotiation strategy in all three
negotiations, where it starts off with a high initial offer and
keeps conceding least wanted items one by one. Since the
agent pushes its partner to share their preferences first, it starts
off with a more reasonable initial offer, which has a better
chance of getting accepted than an all-vs-none offer. How-
ever, this initial offer does become more favorable for the
agent in later negotiations.
Only dealing in full offers: Inspired from Agent
Wotan [Mell et al., 2018a], Pilot only deals in full offers in
order to save time.
Indulging in favor exchange: The baseline agent attempts
to exchange favors early on in the negotiations. This has a
couple of disadvantages:
1. First, whether the favor request is fruitful or not
depends on the personality of the partner such as
their Social Value Orientation [Van Lange et al., 1997;
Cornelissen et al., 2009]. Hence, this may not work
with partners who portray competitive or selfish behav-
ioral traits. In fact, based on prior ANAC competitions,
favor exchange may even back-fire with selfish part-
ners [Mell et al., 2018b].
2. Secondly, even if the favor request is accepted, the agent
only takes minimal advantage by just claiming a single
valuable item.
Ideally, in order to fix the first problem, information about the
personality traits of the partner can be useful. Unfortunately,
such information is not available to the agent. Hence, Pilot
leverages prior research which suggests that framing can help
in promoting pro-social behavior [Pulford et al., 2016]. We
use sentences such as ”I am excited to build the value for both
of us. I hope you are equally excited as well.” and ”Please re-
member: Our joint decisions will determine howmany points
we both earn.” to prime the pro-social behavior in the human
partners, with the aim of increasing the likelihood of the favor
request being accepted.
In order to take the maximum advantage of favor accep-
tance, Pilot does not indulge in favor exchange early on, un-
like the baseline agent. Instead, it holds off the request until
the human partner has shared some of their preferences. If
the favor is accepted, this allows our agent to roll out a full
offer which greatly benefits the agent.
While returning the favor, the agent starts with a reasonable
initial full offer based on the discussed preferences but further
concedes three additional items to the human partner.
2.3 Message Policy
Our message policy mostly follows the provided baseline pol-
icy, with a few modifications:
1. We modified several message choices in the baseline
agent, which we believe might have confused the human
partner in the context of the IAGO platform.
2. If asked, the agent lies about its Best Alternative To a
Negotiated Agreement (BATNA). Pilot inflates the orig-
inal value of BATNA by 1.5 times. This allows the agent
to negotiate from a position of higher bargaining power.
2.4 Expression Policy
The agent displays moderate expressions for the first two ne-
gotiations, promoting a healthy relationship with the part-
ner. However, research has shown the benefits of ex-
treme emotions such as anger in inducing more conces-
sions [de Melo et al., 2011]. Hence, for the third and final
negotiation, the agent displays anger for offer rejects, in the
hope of getting a better deal.
3 Conclusion
In this document, we describe the core elements of our virtual
agent, Pilot. By strategically indulging in favor exchange af-
ter building a strong opponent model, Pilot builds the most
value out of the negotiations, while still maintaining a posi-
tive perception in the eyes of the opponent, making it a finalist
for ANAC at IJCAI 2020.
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